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May 27, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WORKING GROUP (STALIN)

SUBJECT: Agenda for WGS Meeting, Tuesday, June 2, at 2:30 p.m.

In addition to discussing our session with George Kennan, I suggest that we consider [redacted] draft (Enclosure 1) and the proposal attached as Enclosure 2. Additions to either enclosure would be most welcome, as would any preliminary soundings you may be able to make with regard to implementation.

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[redacted]
Acting Director.

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Enclosures:

1. Follow-up on President's Speech and Continuation of PSB D-40 (Draft).
2. Combatting Free World Cleavages.

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FOLLOW-UP ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND CONTINUATION OF PSB D-40

I. Uncovering Soviet Intentions

1. Official utterances concerning a settlement of the cold war should continue to stress the President's theme of "deeds and not words", particularly as it relates to a settlement in Korea and Southeast Asia and to the Austrian peace treaty.

2. A serious proposal should be made to the Kremlin for mutual relaxation of travel restrictions on diplomats. The U.S. should offer to reciprocate, striving for broad freedom of movement for diplomats of both countries. A refusal by the Soviet regime should be publicized in the free world as an indication of Soviet bad faith.

3. A proposal should be made to the European satellites individually for return of USIS, if it is first ascertained that funds are available for this purpose. In order to strengthen the case, the proposal should be made on a basis of reciprocity if possible.

4. An official proposal should be made to the USSR and to selected East European governments, particularly Hungary, that discussions of radio broadcasting and jamming be held. The proposal would state that we should like to know what parts of the VOA broadcast are so objectionable to the governments concerned that they must be jammed. Whether such discussions ensue or not, free world propagandists could remind people of Soviet jamming and also of the particular facts that they do not want their populations to hear.

SECRET

- 2 -

5. Efforts of the governments in Bonn, Tokyo and Rome to gain the release of World War II POW's should be supported and exploited after the Kremlin has had a sufficient time to answer. Religious leaders should renew their requests, particularly for intercession by their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

6. The U.S. Delegate to the U.N. might now suggest that the USSR return to UNESCO, WHO and FAO; or point out that Soviet absence from these bodies is inconsistent with professed Soviet desire to listen to reason on important matters.

II. Fostering Orbit Conflicts

1. Careful unofficial intimations should continue concerning the instability of the present Soviet regime and its lack of control over all of the elements of power of the USSR. The Bermuda meeting offers possibilities in this connection.

2. Resentment of control by the Kremlin in Eastern European countries should be increased wherever possible. For example, some high official should encourage the people of each country after their "elections" that the travesty has not altered U.S. views on captive peoples.

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CONFIDENTIAL**COMBATING FREE WORLD CLEAVAGES**

1. Though Stalin's death enhanced the possibility of exploitable conflicts developing within the communist camp, subsequent months have chiefly brought evidence of widening cleavages in the free world instead. Much of this contrast is probably due merely to the fact that we know a great deal more about our own troubles than about communist ones. Yet that very fact indicates a basis for concrete actions in relation to the free world, aimed at healing the sore spots that make disunity. Such actions are, for the time being, the most constructive opportunities available for supporting the strategy of the President's April 16 speech and PSB D-40.

2. The actions in question should aim at changing the following foreign states of mind particularly:

a. Doubts about the ability of the President to speak for the country because of Congressional encroachment on the Executive Branch.

b. Belief that the United States is hysterical and needlessly intransigent in dealing with the communist threat, at home and abroad.

c. Belief that current acts which restrict foreign trade are more indicative of the real direction of American policy than Administration pronouncements in favor of strengthening free world economies and increasing trade.

3. Proposal: WGS should draw up for PSB consideration a list of suitable actions which might be handled or usefully expedited by PSB to support the aims in paragraph 2.